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Abstract
The types of contracts that arise in a typical vertical manufacturer–retailer relationship are more
sophisticated than usually assumed in standard macroeconomic models. In addition to setting
per-unit prices, manufacturers and retailers revert to non-linear pricing and non-price instruments.
These instruments or contracts are referred to as vertical restraints and can take the form of
franchise fees, resale-price maintenance, exclusive dealing, exclusive territories, and slotting
allowances. The use and the effects of one type of instrument versus another depend crucially on
speciﬁc market assumptions upstream and downstream and on the division of bargaining power
between manufacturers and retailers. The author surveys the industrial organization literature on
retail pricing and shows that vertical restraint instruments have important effects on producer and
consumer prices, market structure, efﬁciency, and welfare. Some potentially important
macroeconomic implications of vertical restraints are suggested.
JEL classiﬁcation: D40, L22, L42
Bank classiﬁcation: Market structure and pricing
Résumé
La relation verticale entre fabricants et détaillants donne lieu à des types de contrats plus
complexes que ceux qui sont généralement postulés dans les modèles macroéconomiques
courants. Fabricants et détaillants ne font pas que ﬁxer des prix unitaires, ils recourent aussi à une
tariﬁcation non linéaire et à des modalités non tarifaires. Ces modalités contractuelles constituent
ce qu’on appelle des contraintes verticales et peuvent inclure le paiement de redevances de
franchisage, l’imposition de prix de revente plafond ou plancher, la signature d’accords de vente
exclusive et d’exclusivité territoriale ou le versement de frais de référencement. Le choix d’un
type de contrainte de préférence à un autre et ses répercussions dépendent avant tout des
hypothèses formulées concernant la structure du marché, en amont comme en aval, et du rapport
de forces entre fabricants et détaillants. L’auteure brosse un tableau de ce que la littérature relative
à l’organisation industrielle nous apprend sur l’établissement des prix de détail. Elle montre que
les contraintes verticales ont un effet notable sur les prix à la production et à la consommation, de
même que sur la structure du marché, l’efﬁcience et le bien-être. Elle relève aussi d’autres
implications susceptibles de revêtir de l’importance sur le plan macroéconomique.
Classiﬁcation JEL : D40, L22, L42
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Structure de marché et ﬁxation des prix1 Introduction
The industrial organization literature on retail pricing is extensive. It focuses on the price-
setting behaviour in vertical structures that consist of upstream manufacturers who sell
their products through downstream retailers. The types of contracts that arise in a vertical
manufacturer–retailer relationship are more sophisticated than a simple uniform-price con-
tract. In addition to setting per-unit prices, manufacturers and retailers revert to vertical
restraints to maximize proﬁts. Vertical restraints can be deﬁned as price and non-price re-
strictions arising in a typical relationship between upstream manufacturers and downstream
retailers. The most common vertical restraints, in practice, are brieﬂy described below.
² A two-part tariﬀ: The manufacturer charges a ﬁxed fee and a per-unit price. The ﬁxed
fee is referred to as a franchise fee.
² Resale-price maintenance (RPM): The manufacturer imposes a price ceiling (p · p) or
a price ﬂoor (p ¸ p). Although RPM is now illegal in most countries, it is still allowed
in some European markets for books, newspapers, and similar cultural products.1
² Quantity ﬁxing: The retailer must sell a minimum amount of the product. This type
of vertical control is common in beer distribution in licensed restaurants and pubs.
² Exclusive territories (ETs): The retailer is granted exclusivity (monopoly) within a ge-
ographical area or over a particular class of consumer or goods. Newspaper distribution
is an example of the use of exclusive territories.
² Exclusive dealing (ED): The retailer must sell only the manufacturer’s brand within a
product market. This type of restraint is commonly used in the automobile industry.
Coca-Cola and Pepsi also impose this type of restriction on their retailers. Although
exclusive dealing was initially forbidden in the United States, it is currently judged
according to a rule of reason.
² Slotting allowances: The manufacturer pays the retailer a fee for carrying new products
or allocating shelf space to their products. The fees can be cash gifts or payments in
1See Beck (2003) and Backhaus and Hansen (2000) for more on RPM in the German book market. RPM
was commonly used in the book market and the retail chemist and drugstore markets in the United Kingdom
until 1995 and 2001, respectively, when it was abolished.
1kind. Because the fees are negotiated in private, data on slotting allowances are almost
impossible to obtain. Slotting allowances, however, are commonly used in the grocery
industry and, according to a study by Deloitte & Touche (1990), they account for up to
$9 billion in annual grocery expenditures and about 16 per cent of all costs associated
with the introduction of a new product on the market.
Empirical work on the use and eﬀects of vertical restraints on pricing is scarce. To the
author’s knowledge, the only empirical evidence that exists deals with the use of slotting
allowances in the food and pharmaceuticals industries. Despite this lack of empirical analy-
ses, other types of vertical restraints, such as exclusive dealing and exclusive territories, are
commonly used in the automobile and transportation industries. Given the importance of
these industries for the economy, more empirical work is needed to quantify the eﬀects of
exclusive dealing and territories on pricing and market structure.
For decades, vertical restraints have been the subject of vehement debate among antitrust
economists and practitioners. The debate concerns the eﬀects of vertical restraints on con-
sumer and producer prices, welfare, and competition. The use and the eﬀects of one type of
restraint versus another depend crucially on speciﬁc market structure assumptions upstream
and downstream, and on which has the bargaining power: the upstream or downstream
ﬁrms.
To see how vertical restraints can arise in equilibrium, consider the simple vertical struc-
ture with one manufacturer and one retailer. Under simple uniform-price contracts, the
manufacturer chooses the wholesale price paid by the retailer for the intermediate product
and the retailer chooses the retail (consumer, ﬁnal) price for the product sold to consumers.
In this case, each ﬁrm prices above marginal cost, giving rise to “double marginalization.”
The equilibrium retail price is above the price that would maximize the proﬁts of the verti-
cally integrated structure (the proﬁts of the manufacturer and retailer together). This is a
typical vertical externality problem. When the retailer increases the retail price, a negative
externality is imposed on the manufacturer, because the retailer ignores the reduction in
the manufacturer’s proﬁts as a consequence of lower sales. Similarly, the manufacturer sets
the wholesale price above marginal cost, ignoring the eﬀect this will have on the retailer’s
proﬁts. The double markup problem results in a retail price that is too high, and lower
social welfare than with the vertically integrated structure. A manufacturer that has all the
2bargaining power has incentives to use vertical restraints such as franchise fees and RPM to
capture the entire surplus (that is, the proﬁts of the vertical structure). Vertical restraints
are essentially a means of capturing the proﬁts of the vertically integrated structure without
actual integration. In this simple framework, by imposing a franchise fee or RPM to set a
price ceiling, the manufacturer can capture the entire surplus of the vertical structure. The
result is a lower consumer price and higher welfare than when only uniform pricing is al-
lowed. Thus, vertical restraints can be welfare-improving, while they do not have any eﬀect
on competition.
In a more general set-up, with one manufacturer and n retailers, in addition to the
vertical externality already discussed, a horizontal externality can be identiﬁed. It results
from the fact that one retailer cannot capture the entire beneﬁt of increasing the retail price.
An increase in the retail price by one retailer has a positive externality on the rival retailers
because consumers shift to the rivals. Since the retailer does not take this eﬀect into account,
the consumer price is typically too low from the viewpoint of the vertical structure. The
vertical and the horizontal externalities work in opposite directions; the overall eﬀect depends
on which externality dominates. It is straightforward that, in this context, competition at
the retail level gives rise to horizontal externalities. The manufacturer can eliminate the
horizontal externality by reducing downstream competition. One way this can be achieved is
by granting retailers exclusive territories; that is, granting each retailer a monopoly position
over a geographical area or class of consumers. This is a situation where the use of vertical
restraints has anti-competitive eﬀects, and it can also be shown that the restraints reduce
welfare.
In the last three decades, the retail industry has undergone important changes. The
appearance of big-box retailers and increased concentration in the retail industry has shifted
bargaining power downstream. The early literature on retail market power argues that bigger
retailers are desirable because they can exercise countervailing power over manufacturers to
lower wholesale prices and they can pass the savings on to consumers. Subsequent work has
shown, however, that countervailing power does not always lead to lower consumer prices.
As will be discussed in section 4, the eﬀects of countervailing power depend on the type of
competition at the retail level.
The shift of bargaining power at the retail level over the last three decades has been
accompanied by the emergence of new vertical restraint instruments, such as slotting al-
3lowances. Slotting allowances are fees that manufacturers pay retailers for carrying new
products or allocating shelf space to their products. As with other vertical restraints, slot-
ting allowances have ambiguous eﬀects on prices and welfare. When manufacturers willingly
oﬀer slotting allowances, welfare is lower than with no slotting allowances. On the other
hand, when retailers require slotting allowances, low-quality manufacturers are screened out
of the market and this increases social welfare more than in cases with no-slotting allowances.
Table 1 summarizes the eﬀects of various vertical restraints examined in the literature and
surveyed in this paper. The importance of vertical restraints pertains to market structure,
pricing decisions, eﬃciency, and welfare. Besides their signiﬁcance for competition policy,
vertical restraints have potentially important macroeconomic implications via their eﬀects
on market structure. Market power has important consequences for the interpretation of
the business cycles (Rotemberg and Woodford, 1995) and can reduce inﬂation volatility
(Amano and Hendry, 2003). In an international context, market share also inﬂuences pricing
decisions and has implications for the exchange rate pass-through (Froot and Klemperer,
1989). Therefore, a better understanding of the microeconomics of price-setting behaviour
is needed to fully explain price adjustment in macroeconomics models.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, vertical restraints are examined
in a framework where the upstream market is monopolistic and the manufacturer has all
the bargaining power. In section 3, the assumption is made that the upstream market is
competitive, while manufacturers maintain their bargaining power. In section 4, retailers
are allowed to have all the bargaining power and the types of vertical restraints that arise in
equilibrium are examined. Section 5 concludes.
2 Upstream Monopoly and Vertical Restraints
Consider a monopolist who produces a good at marginal cost, c, and sells it downstream to
n retailers. Assume that the upstream monopolist has all the bargaining power and moves
ﬁrst by announcing the wholesale price, pw. Upon observing pw, retailers choose consumer
prices, pi, and retail services, si, i = 1;n, independently. Denote the demand for good i by
Di(p;s), where p = (p1;::;pn) 2 <n
+ and s = (s1;::;sn) 2 <n
+. Providing retail services costs
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The relationship between manufacturer and retailers is of a principal-agent type, with the
manufacturer acting as a principal and a Stackelberg price leader. Retailer i’s problem is to
choose the retail price, pi, and service, si, to maximize proﬁts:
Π
Ri = (p
i ¡ pw ¡ Φ(s
i))D
i(p;s); (2)
taking pw as given. The Nash equilibrium retail prices, p(pw) = (p1(pw);::;pn(pw)), and
services, s(pw) = (s1(pw);::;sn(pw)), then solve the ﬁrst-order conditions:
D
i(p;s) + (p
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i))
@Di(p;s)
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@si = 0; 8i = 1;n: (4)
The manufacturer anticipates the retail prices and services chosen at the second stage and
chooses the wholesale price to maximize proﬁts:
Π
M = (pw ¡ c)D
i(p(pw);s(pw)): (5)
The equilibrium wholesale price then solves the ﬁrst-order condition:
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To compare the outcomes of the non-integrated and the fully integrated markets, retailer i’s
proﬁt can be written as a function of the vertically integrated proﬁt:
Π
Ri = Π
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5Expressions (9) and (10) are key to understanding the outcomes of the decentralized and ver-
tically integrated markets. They reveal two types of externalities present in the decentralized
market: a vertical externality that arises between the upstream and downstream markets,
and a horizontal externality that arises in the downstream market. In what follows, each
type of externality is discussed in turn. The proﬁt of the vertically integrated structure is
maximized when the ﬁrst terms on the right-hand side of (9) and (10) are both equal to zero.
The second and third terms on the right-hand side of each expression are what diﬀerentiates
the outcomes of the non-integrated and fully integrated structure. The second terms in (9)
and (10) represent the vertical pricing and service externalities, respectively. The vertical
externality is due to the fact that the retailer, when choosing the resale price and retail ser-
vice, ignores the eﬀect of this choice on the manufacturer’s proﬁt, and chooses a lower retail
price than the one that maximizes joint proﬁts. The extra proﬁt the manufacturer obtains
when the retailer sells an additional unit of the good is (pw ¡ c). The manufacturer thus
chooses a price level that is too high and a service level that is too low compared with those
of the vertical structure. The vertical externality disappears when the retailer’s marginal
cost, pw, coincides with the marginal cost of the vertically integrated market, c. The third
terms are the horizontal externalities—pricing and service. The horizontal externality results
from the fact that the retailer cannot appropriate the entire beneﬁt of increasing retail prices
and services: when retailer i changes prices and services, the demand faced by retailer j is
aﬀected. This eﬀect is captured by the cross-elasticity of demand in the third term in (9)
and (10). Since each retailer i ignores the eﬀect of their choice on the other retailers’ proﬁts,
each retailer tends to choose a retail price that is too low and a service level that is too high
compared with those of the vertical market. The vertical and horizontal pricing externalities
work in opposite directions: the vertical externality induces retailers to set retail prices that
are too high, whereas horizontal externalities result in prices that are too low. Whether the
ﬁnal retail price in the decentralized market is higher or lower than that of the vertically
integrated market depends on which externality dominates — the vertical or the horizontal.
The same is true for the service externality, except that the vertical externality pushes ser-
vice levels too low, whereas the horizontal externality pushes them too high compared with
the vertical market.
There are cases where retailers provide pre-sale services that cannot be monitored or
contracted upon. Pre-sale services and information can be particularly important in the sale
6of durable goods; for example, a test-drive of an automobile, demonstrations by salespeople,
or the trying on of clothing before a purchase. Besides vertical externalities, competition in
the retail market gives rise to horizontal pricing and service externalities among retailers.
The idea is similar to that of public goods. Providing a retail service is costly and thus forces
the retailer who provides it to charge a higher price than a retailer who does not provide it.
This gives consumers incentives to obtain the pre-sale service (information) from the retailer
who oﬀers it and then to buy the good from the retailer who does not oﬀer the service but
charges a lower price. Tesler (1960) argues that retailers have incentives to free ride on each
other’s pre-sale information and services, and that this results in underprovision of services.
In this environment, retailers have incentives to set excessively high retail prices and un-
derprovide retail service compared with those levels that maximize the proﬁt of the vertically
integrated market. It is evident that the wholesale price alone is not a suﬃcient instrument
to bring price and service levels to the optimal levels that maximize integrated proﬁts. The
manufacturer can choose the wholesale price to eliminate the vertical externality; that is,
to induce the retailer to set the retail price at the optimal level of the integrated market.
To eliminate the horizontal externality, the manufacturer can then use either one of the
instruments or vertical restraints identiﬁed in Proposition 1, which is adapted from Winter
(1993).
Proposition 1 The manufacturer can appropriate the vertically integrated proﬁt either by:
(i) a two-part tariﬀ and a price ﬂoor, or (ii) a wholesale price equal to the marginal cost, c,
and ETs.
To see how RPM and ETs work in this environment, use pm to denote the optimal price
that maximizes proﬁts of the integrated market. Start by examining how the manufacturer
can appropriate the vertically integrated proﬁt by using a two-part tariﬀ and a price ﬂoor.
It is easy to see that imposing a price ﬂoor, p ¸ pm, would induce the retailer to choose the
retail price optimally equal to pm. The manufacturer can then adjust the wholesale price to
induce the retailer to provide the optimal level of service in the integrated market. Finally,
the manufacturer chooses the lump-sum fee (or the franchise fee) to appropriate the retailers’
surplus. The rationale for using ETs is even simpler. Essentially, in this environment,
competition is a bad thing: competition between retailers gives rise to vertical and horizontal
externalities. The manufacturer can eliminate these externalities by eliminating competition
in the retail sector. One way to achieve this is by granting a monopoly position to one of
7the retailers. This eliminates the horizontal externality. The manufacturer can then set the
wholesale price equal to the marginal cost and thus eliminate the vertical externality.
Although vertical integration or suﬃcient vertical restraints eliminate both types of ex-
ternalities, they do not necessarily increase welfare. In fact, Winter (1993) shows that there
are many parameter values for which welfare is increased if the manufacturer is not allowed to
use any vertical restraints. This is not surprising, given that the manufacturer uses vertical
restraints to support an excessively high level of service compared with the level that maxi-
mizes total proﬁts plus consumer surplus. Total welfare can thus be increased by prohibiting
vertical restraints.
The above discussion has shown that competition in pre-sale services gives rise to free
riding by retailers. In contrast, in Bolton and Bonanno (1988), retailers provide cum-sales or
post-sales services, or both. In this case, there is no free-rider problem, since the consumer
can get the service only if they buy the good. This type of service, however, gives rise
to vertical diﬀerentiation: if two distinct products are oﬀered at the same price, then all
consumers will buy from the retailer that oﬀers the product of higher quality. Bolton and
Bonanno show that, under a linear-price contract, the proﬁt of the decentralized market is less
than that of the vertically integrated market, because the horizontal externality outweighs the
vertical externality, which makes retail prices too low compared with the vertical structure.
Although franchise fees and RPM dominate the optimal linear-price contract, they are not
suﬃcient to replicate the outcome of the vertically integrated structure. The intuition is as
follows. Franchise fees are transfers from the retailers to the manufacturer, and therefore
they do not change the total proﬁt of the decentralized structure. RPM is ineﬃcient because
it precludes diﬀerentiation, which would be chosen by the vertically integrated structure.
2.1 The “double marginalization” problem
To understand the basic vertical externality, consider the special case with one manufacturer
and one retailer. The decentralized market consists of a chain of monopolies. In this case,
n = 1 and the subscript i above can be dropped. Also assume that the retailer does not
provide any retail service. The demand function is then D(p), with D0(¢) < 0, D00(¢) < 0.
The sequence of decisions is the same as before.
Since both the manufacturer and retailer are monopolists, they price above marginal cost.
8Therefore, pw > c and p > pw. The two monopolists, acting independently, set prices above
marginal costs. This is the “double marginalization” problem identiﬁed by Spengler (1950).
The upstream monopolist chooses a wholesale price above marginal cost. The downstream
monopolist takes this wholesale price as the marginal cost and sets the retail price above
it. The basic vertical externality is due to the fact that the retailer ignores the eﬀect of
their choice of retail price on the manufacturer’s proﬁt. For every additional unit of the
good the retailer succeeds in selling as a result of their pricing strategy, the manufacturer
obtains an extra proﬁt of (pw ¡ c). Since the retailer maximizes their own proﬁt, ignoring
the eﬀect of their choice on the manufacturer’s proﬁt, the retailer tends to choose a retail
price that is too high from the manufacturer’s viewpoint. The vertical externality is a result
of the diﬀerence between the retailer’s marginal cost, pw, and that of the vertical structure,
c. This implies that the decentralized market generates a higher retail price and lower proﬁt
than the vertically integrated market. To see this, consider pricing decisions in the vertically
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The monopoly price, pV I, then solves the ﬁrst-order condition:
D(p
V I) + (p
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0(p
V I) = 0; (12)
which can be written in the well-known form





where " = ¡pV ID0(pV I)=D(pV I) is the demand elasticity at the monopoly price.
Proposition 2 The proﬁts of the integrated market are higher than the proﬁts of the non-
integrated market; the consumer price in the integrated market is lower than the consumer
price in the non-integrated market.
If either the upstream or the downstream market is competitive, the vertical externality
vanishes, because the competitive market does not introduce price distortion. In this case,
Proposition 2 is no longer true; that is, vertical integration does not generate higher proﬁts
than the decentralized market.
9When both the upstream and the downstream market are monopolies, as above, the
manufacturer has incentives to acquire the downstream market and eliminate the vertical
externality. If a merger is not possible—for example, because of high costs or regulation—the
manufacturer can sometimes reproduce the outcome of the fully integrated structure by using
a set of vertical control instruments of the type identiﬁed in section 1. Proposition 3 identiﬁes
those contracts (or instruments) that allow the manufacturer to replicate the outcome of the
vertical structure.
Proposition 3 The manufacturer can realize the proﬁt of the integrated market without
integration by using a two-part tariﬀ or by imposing RPM.
The imediate implication of Propositions 2 and 3 is as follows:
Corollary 1 Welfare can be increased by vertical integration or by using suﬃcient vertical
restraints.
2.2 Monopolistically competitive retailers
Dixit (1983) and Gallini and Winter (1983) extend the analysis to the case of a monopo-
listically competitive retail market. Assume that the retail market is monopolistically com-
petitive and retailers do not provide any retail service. Denote by qi = D(p1;::;pn;n) the
demand facing retailer i, where n is the number of retailers in the market. Let q = D(p;n) ´
Pn
i=1 D(p;::;p;n). Retailer i chooses the retail price to maximize proﬁts, and in equilibrium
proﬁts are driven to zero. Retailers are assumed to be identical; therefore, in a symmetric
equilibrium they charge the same retail price, p. The equilibrium retail price and number of
retailers then solve
(p ¡ pw)=p = 1="d; (14)
(p ¡ pw)q=n ¡ F = 0; (15)
where "d is retailer i’s perceived elasticity of demand and F is the franchise fee. The manu-
facturer sets the wholesale price, pw, to maximize proﬁts:
Π
M = (pw ¡ c)q: (16)
Gallini and Winter derive conditions under which the upstream monopolist can replicate
the outcome of full integration by imposing RPM: price ceilings or price ﬂoors. Under a
10price ﬂoor, p greater than the decentralized p, retailers enter the market until downstream
proﬁts become zero. The new equilibrium number of retailers is n ¸ n. A price ﬂoor thus
has two opposing eﬀects on the total demand q = D(p;n): a negative eﬀect due to the
price increase and a positive eﬀect due to the bigger number of retailers. The total eﬀect
depends on which of these two eﬀects dominates. This, in turn, depends on the magnitude
of retailer i’s perceived elasticity of demand, "d. If "d is high, a price ﬂoor slightly above the
decentralized retail price has a large negative eﬀect on the equilibrium output of each retailer.
Consequently, a large number of retailers enter the market until proﬁts are driven to zero.
The large increase in the equilibrium number of retailers has a positive eﬀect on demand.
The overall eﬀect of a price ﬂoor is thus positive. Gallini and Winter also derive some
conditions under which the private proﬁtability of RPM is suﬃcient for social desirability.
For a price ﬂoor to be welfare-improving at the margin, the marginal rate of substitution in
terms of consumer surplus between greater product diversity and lower price must exceed
the marginal rate of substitution for the monopolist, which is the slope of the iso-demand
curve.
Dixit (1983) compares the private and social desirability of vertical integration and ﬁnds
that the fully integrated equilibrium has a higher social welfare than the outcome of mo-
nopolistic competition. The upstream monopolist can use vertical restraints to shift their
average cost function, and hence the ﬁnal equilibrium. If vertical integration is not feasible,
the upstream monopolist can sometimes use a two-part tariﬀ to replicate the outcome of full
integration. Even if a two-part tariﬀ cannot perfectly replicate full integration, it can be used
with other instruments to produce outcomes that are more desirable than non-integration,
from a social viewpoint.
The previous results are derived on the assumption that contracts between manufacturers
and retailers are observable. O’Brien and Shaﬀer (1992) show that, when the upstream ﬁrm
engages in secret bilateral contracts with downstream retailers, the vertically integrated
outcome can no longer be achieved with non-linear pricing. The intuition is that, for any
contract that induces the vertically integrated outcome, the manufacturer can engage in
secret negotiations with any retailer to reduce the retail price and thus shift consumers and
proﬁts away from rival retailers. O’Brien and Shaﬀer also consider the case where bargaining
power is more evenly distributed and show that there is no bargaining equilibrium that
maximizes joint proﬁts.
112.3 Market uncertainty
The following uses the analysis in Rey and Tirole (1986) and Tirole (1988) to examine the role
of uncertainty in determining the optimal contract between the manufacturer and retailers.
Retailers face two types of uncertainty:
(i) Demand uncertainty: demand depends on a random variable µ 2 [µ;µ], which can refer
to consumer tastes and demographics.
(ii) Retail-cost uncertainty: retail cost is aﬀected by technological changes, wages, and
input prices. The retail cost ° is a random variable distributed on [°;°].
There are n identical retailers and each of them signs a contract with the manufacturer before
µ and ° are realized. The manufacturer does not observe the realizations of µ and °, the
quantity sold by an individual retailer and the retailers’ prices and proﬁts.2 The uncertainty
is observed by the retailers after their contract is signed but before they take their pricing
decisions.
In this environment, Rey and Tirole (1986) show that RPM is not suﬃcient to eliminate
the vertical price distortion. To see this, recall that, in a deterministic environment, the
manufacturer can appropriate the proﬁts of the vertically integrated market by setting either
a price ﬂoor or a price ceiling. With uncertainty, this is no longer feasible, since the retailer
makes pricing decisions before the demand uncertainty is resolved and this makes the retail
price unresponsive to demand and retail-cost conditions. Furthermore, when the retailer is
risk-averse, the retailer is not able to pass the cost uncertainty on to consumers and bears
too much risk.
Since RPM does not work in this environment, the manufacturer can resort to a two-part
tariﬀ to realize the proﬁt of the integrated structure. To see how a two-part tariﬀ works,
consider a simple model adapted from Rey and Tirole (1986). Denote the demand function
by D(p;µ), with (@D=@p) < 0, (@D=@µ) > 0. After observing µ and °, the retailer chooses
the retail price to maximize proﬁts according to
max
p
(p ¡ pw ¡ °)D(p;µ): (17)
2The manufacturer might not be able to observe retail prices when retailers oﬀer secret price discounts
to consumers, or when they oﬀer service packages that are not directly observable.
12The contract between the manufacturer and retailers must satisfy a participation constraint.
The expected utility the retailer obtains by signing the contract must be at least as high as
that from not signing the contract:
Eu[(p ¡ pw ¡ °)D(p;µ) ¡ F] ¸ u(0); (18)
where u(¢) is the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function and it is assumed that the
retailer obtains zero proﬁts if they do not sign the contract.
The problem for the manufacturer is to induce the retailers to choose the retail price,
pV I, that maximizes the ex post proﬁts of the integrated market:
p
V I = argmax
p
(p ¡ c ¡ °)D(p;µ): (19)
If it is further assumed that the manufacturer can observe the areas of distribution of the
retailers, the manufacturer can use ETs to create local monopolies. ETs divide the market
into n territories; each retailer has a monopoly power in one part of the market and faces
demand D(p;°)=n. With ETs arrangements, the manufacturer can set the wholesale price
to marginal cost, pw = c, in which case the problem of the individual retailer becomes
max
p
(p ¡ c ¡ °)D(p;µ)=n ¡ F; (20)
the solution to which gives the optimal retail price, pV I.
The participation constraint (18) shows that, if retailers are risk-averse, the manufacturer
is concerned with the amount of risk the retailer bears. The more risk the retailer takes, the
lower the lump-sum fee, F, the manufacturer can charge. The manufacturer has incentives to
share the risk of the retailer. One way to do this is to increase the wholesale price and reduce
the lump-sum fee. Under demand uncertainty, an increase in the wholesale price reduces the
retailer’s proﬁt margin and risk. In order to keep the participation constraint satisﬁed, the
manufacturer must reduce the lump-sump fee. Under cost uncertainty, an increase in the
wholesale price increases the retail price and reduces demand. The lower demand reduces
the retailer’s risk. Proposition 4 summarizes the results.
Proposition 4 Under uncertainty and risk-averse retailers, competition, RPM, and ETs are
not equivalent. Under demand uncertainty, the manufacturer prefers RPM to competition
and competition to ETs. Under cost uncertainty, the manufacturer prefers competition to
ETs, and ETs to RPM.
13To understand the result in Proposition 4, recall that the manufacturer has two objectives:
to ensure optimal exploitation of monopoly power by the vertical structure, and to provide
adequate insurance to retailers. Proposition 4 allows the outcomes of competition, ETs,
and RPM to be ranked according to these two objectives. Thus, ETs make better use of
decentralized information than competition and RPM. Competition has very good insurance
properties under both types of uncertainty, and RPM gives perfect insurance under demand
uncertainty, but it lets retailers bear the whole risk under cost uncertainty. ETs also have
mediocre insurance properties.
In the previous subsections it was shown that, in a deterministic environment, vertical
restraints that reduce competition are welfare-improving: not only are the manufacturer and
the retailer better oﬀ when competition is reduced, but so are consumers. This is no longer
the case under uncertainty. Proposition 5 gives the welfare implications of uncertainty.
Proposition 5 Under uncertainty, both the expected net consumer surplus and the aggregate
welfare are higher under competition than under ETs.
Consumers prefer competition in this environment because the expected retail price is
lower under competition and the variance of consumption is higher under competition. The
intuition for this is as follows. Under uncertainty, the manufacturer may want to change the
wholesale price to reduce the retailer’s risk. Under competition, the retailer’s proﬁt is inde-
pendent of the wholesale price and, therefore, a wholesale price adjustment does not reduce
risk. Under ETs or RPM, the manufacturer can decrease the retailer’s risk by increasing the
wholesale price; a lower proﬁt margin means a lower variance of proﬁts. With respect to the
variance of consumption, the following argument applies. Under demand uncertainty, the
competition price is determined entirely by cost conditions. Therefore, the price does not
adjust to demand shocks. The same is true under RPM. Under ETs, the consumer partially
adjusts to demand conditions, so consumption varies more under competition and RPM.
Under cost uncertainty, the competitive price adjusts perfectly, partially under ETs and not
at all under RPM.
Blair and Lewis (1994) develop a model where the manufacturer can observe neither the
level of service provided by the retailer nor the state of the demand. In this framework, both
adverse selection and moral hazard problems arise: the retailer can claim that high sales are
due to a high level of service, while low sales are due to an adverse-demand shock. In this
14case, Blair and Lewis show that the optimal contract involves resale-price maintenance and
quantity ﬁxing. The choice of price and quantity enables the manufacturer to determine
more accurately whether an increase in sales is attributable to promotional eﬀort or a high
demand realization. The main diﬀerence between Rey and Tirole (1986) and Blair and
Lewis (1994) is that, in the latter, the manufacturer oﬀers the retailer a menu of contracts
contingent on the realization of µ. By the revelation principle, attention can be restricted
to those contracts that induce the retailer to truthfully reveal µ. This again makes RPM
eﬀective, as opposed to the Rey and Tirole result.
3 Upstream Competition and Vertical Restraints
In this section, it is assumed that manufacturers are engaging in interbrand competition.
The most common type of vertical restraint manufacturers revert to in this context is ED,
which stipulates that a retailer may not sell a brand that competes with the manufac-
turer’s product. Early work on ED began with Bork (1978), who claims that ED is welfare-
improving. He argues that ED essentially reduces consumer choices but is compensated for
by a lower wholesale price and possibly a lower retailer price. The retailer, who acts as an
agent for consumers, accepts the contract only if the reduction in the wholesale price more
than compensates for the reduction in variety. Thus, ED beneﬁts consumers and increases
competition.
On the other hand, Comanor and Frech (1985) show that ED can be anti-competitive:
the incumbent manufacturer can use ED strategically to deter entry by raising rivals’ costs.
There are two types of consumers in this model: (i) those who are brand loyal and purchase
the dominant manufacturer’s product rather than a competiting brand as long as the price
does not exceed that of the rival’s by some ﬁxed amount, and (ii) those who view the
products of all sellers as identical. At the same time, incumbent retailers have lower costs
than new entrants. The incumbent can impose ED on its retailers and can thus set a limit
price from the diﬀerential distribution costs. When the manufacturer imposes ED on the
incumbent retailers, the manufacturer can either deter entry or set a high limit price and
allow entrants to serve only undiscriminating consumers. As a result, consumers generally
pay higher prices. Comanor and Frech thus view ED as anti-competitive.
One of the criticisms of Comanor and Frech (1985) is that they do not describe a subgame-
15perfect equilibrium. Schwartz (1987) points out that the manufacturer has a potential com-
mitment problem in Comanor and Frech (1985): if the retailer holds out, the manufacturer
is better oﬀ choosing non-exclusive dealing (NED) than turning to high-cost entrants. Co-
manor and Frech, however, assume that, once the manufacturer has chosen between ED and
NED, they can commit to their choice even if it is not optimal.
Mathewson and Winter (1987), in their comment on the Comanor and Frech paper,
try to reconcile the two earlier views on ED. They consider an environment in which two
manufacturers supply diﬀerentiated products to a single retailer, who is a local monopolist.
Following Mathewson and Winter (1987), denote by ΠR(p1
w;p2
w) the retailer’s proﬁt without
ED; that is, both products are bought at wholesale prices p1
w and p2
w. Denote by ˆ ΠR(pi
w) the
retailer’s proﬁt under ED with manufacturer i. Manufacturer i’s proﬁt when both products
are carried is denoted by ΠMi(p1
w;p2
w). Finally, ˆ ΠMi(pi
w) denotes manufacturer i’s proﬁt
under ED. Mathewson and Winter address two questions: (i) whether ED is observed in
equilibrium, and (ii) what the eﬀects are of prohibiting ED on prices, proﬁts, and welfare.
In the absence of ED, the game is reduced to the simple Bertrand duopoly price game.
Denote by a “star” the equilibrium prices when neither manufacturer oﬀers ED, the proﬁt




¤), i = 1;2.
Let ci denote the marginal cost of manufacturer i. Assume that one product has a larger
market than the other:
ˆ Π
R1(c1) > ˆ Π
R2(c2): (21)
The two manufacturers compete by oﬀering contracts that consist of wholesale prices, pi
w,
and ED. When at least one of the manufacturers oﬀers ED, the retailer must choose between






w) = ˆ Π
R2(c2); (22)
and manufacturer 2 oﬀers a wholesale price equal to c2. Only manufacturer 1 has incentives












It is easy to see that the wholesale price of the dominant ﬁrm falls with an ED contract.
Given the equilibrium wholesale price, ˆ p1




16and only if ˆ ΠR1(p1
w
¤) < ˆ ΠR2(c2), which is consistent with ED in equilibrium. The reduction
in the wholesale price below the equilibrium price under NED is essentially an implicit bribe
to the retailer for exclusivity.
Mathewson and Winter use simulated examples to examine the eﬀects of ED on welfare
and show that welfare could rise or fall in the presence of ED compared with the case
when this type of arrangement is prohibited. They show that welfare is more likely to
fall with ED when demand for the two products is very asymmetric. When the market is
nearly symmetric, the bribe to the retailer necessary to meet ﬁrm 2’s best ED oﬀer is so
large that the Bertrand proﬁts exceed manufacturer 1’s ED proﬁts. The wholesale price of
manufacturer 1 falls far enough with ED that it makes ED unproﬁtable. As the market
becomes less symmetric, however, the fall in manufacturer 1’s wholesale price is suﬃciently
small that the manufacturer can capture the entire market and ED would become proﬁtable.
Proposition mathwinter below summarizes these results.
Proposition 6 (Mathewson and Winter, 1987) When manufacturers compete in price and
by oﬀering ED contracts, the equilibrium is characterized by the dominant manufacturer
oﬀering an ED contract. The wholesale price of the dominant ﬁrm falls with an ED contract,
and welfare is more likely to fall with an ED when the market is nearly symmetric.
The results of Mathewson and Winter depend on the assumption that the retailer is a
local monopolist. When the area is large enough to accommodate more than one retailer,
ED introduces spatial diﬀerentiation by retailers. This possibility is examined in Besanko
and Perry (1994) and Dobson and Waterson (1994). In those two papers, two manufacturers
produce diﬀerentiated brands that are sold to consumers through spatially diﬀerentiated
retailers. The authors ﬁnd that ED always generates higher proﬁts for manufacturers and
results in higher prices and higher transportation costs for consumers. Even so, exclusive
dealing may still increase welfare, because it reduces the ﬁxed costs of retailing, such as the
cost of inventory and store space. Numerical examples show that welfare is most likely to
increase when economies of scope in retailing are weak.
In Mathewson and Winter (1987), the incentive for ED critically depends on the assump-
tion that the manufacturer is restricted to linear pricing. Perry and Besanko (1991) allow
manufacturers to use a two-part tariﬀ and RPM. The model consists of two manufacturers
competing for ED contracts with a ﬁxed but large number of retailers. Manufacturers oﬀer
17retailers contracts that consist of a wholesale price (above marginal cost) and a positive fran-
chise fee. If RPM is allowed, manufacturers essentially also set the retail price. The brands
of the two manufacturers are imperfect substitutes, and so are the retailers who carry those
brands. Perry and Besanko ﬁrst characterize the equilibrium with ED and compare the
outcomes with and without RPM. Their results show that minimum RPM results in higher
retail prices, higher retail proﬁts, and higher manufacturer proﬁts if manufacturers cannot
set a wholesale price above marginal cost and can use only a franchise fee. Minimum RPM
allows manufacturers to eliminate the retail price competition among retailers who carry the
brand. Manufacturers essentially use RPM to compete with each other on the retail price.
When manufacturers can charge only a wholesale price, maximum RPM results in lower
retail prices and lower retail proﬁts, but higher manufacturing proﬁts. Maximum RPM al-
lows manufacturers to reduce the retail price that the retailers can charge. Lower consumer
prices increase sales and this ﬁnally increases manufacturers’ proﬁts even if the wholesale
price remains unchanged. Retail proﬁts decrease because the reduction in the retail margin
dominates the increase in sales from lower retail prices. These two results are reversed when
manufacturers can set both a wholesale price and a franchise fee in the equilibrium without
RPM, because the form of RPM (minimum or maximum) depends only on the relationship
between the wholesale and the retail prices in the RPM equilibrium. The eﬀect of RPM
on the retail price depends on the relationship between the reference equilibrium without
RPM and the appropriate equilibrium with RPM. As Perry and Besanko argue, these results
suggest that, when discussing the legality of RPM, one should focus not only on the form
of RPM but also on the change in the retail price when RPM is allowed. Proposition 7
summarizes Perry and Besanko’s results.
Proposition 7 (Perry and Besanko, 1991) (i) When manufacturers can charge only a
wholesale price, maximum RPM results in lower retail prices and lower retail proﬁts, but
higher manufacturer proﬁts. (ii) When manufacturers can charge only a franchise fee, min-
imum RPM results in higher retail prices, higher retail proﬁts, and higher manufacturing
proﬁts.
The results in O’Brien and Shaﬀer (1997) contrast sharply with those in Mathewson
and Winter (1987). The latter study ﬁnds that ED makes manufacturers better oﬀ when
non-linear pricing is not feasible. O’Brien and Shaﬀer allow for non-linear pricing in the up-
stream market and show that, although market foreclosure equilibria—a situation in which
18one manufacturer is excluded from the market even though a fully integrated ﬁrm would sell
both goods—exist, they are Pareto-dominated by all non-foreclosure equilibria. The analysis
suggests that ED arrangements oﬀer manufacturers no advantage: if a fully integrated ﬁrm
would sell only one good, the unique equilibrium outcome replicates the integrated solution
and can be supported by non-linear pricing alone. This renders ED redundant. If a fully
integrated ﬁrm would sell both goods, there exist foreclosure and non-foreclosure equilib-
ria. In this case, ED is not redundant; however, manufacturers would be better oﬀ without
these arrangements, because they widen the set of foreclosure equilibria to include situa-
tions in which foreclosure would not have been possible. Therefore, the incidence of market
foreclosure is reduced in the absence of ED.
Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley (1991) consider a situation in which a manufacturer who
is a monopolist can use ED arrangements to exploit the coordination problem of consumers so
as to exclude potential entrants. The monopolist cannot sign a contract with each consumer
not to deal with potential competitors. If there is a minimum eﬃciency scale that is necessary
for the potential rival to operate, however, the monopolist need only lock up a suﬃcient
number of consumers so that the minimum scale is not achieved. If each consumer believes
that the others will sign, each consumer will also believe that no rival seller would enter.
Each consumer would thus sign the exclusionary agreement. Lack of coordination renders
“naked” exclusion proﬁtable.
A related study by Bernheim and Whinston (1998) provides a more general analysis
of ED by allowing for a general class of contracts between manufacturers and the retailer.
Bernheim and Whinston show that these arrangements can be irrelevant, anti-competitive,
or eﬃciency-enhancing, depending on the setting. They consider a situation where manu-
facturers compete for a single downstream retailer. In this case, ED leads to monopolization
of the upstream market, because one of the manufacturers can choose the wholesale price to
foreclose their potential rival from access to the downstream market. In contrast, Martimort
(1996) considers the case where all manufacturers have access to the downstream market
and ﬁnd a retailer to sell their products. In Martimort’s model, manufacturers have a choice
between distributing their products through a common retailer or through a single retailer
who accepts an ED contract. Manufacturers face an incentive problem, because they do not
observe the ﬁnal demand for their product (or the retailer’s cost of selling it). In the case
where manufacturers choose to sell through a common retailer, each manufacturer becomes
19a principal for the common agent-cum-retailer. Martimort’s analysis shows that, depending
on the extent of the adverse selection problem and on the substitutability of their brands,
manufacturers prefer to use a common or an exclusive retailer.
Besanko and Perry (1993) identify an interbrand externality that arises because brand-
enhancing investments made by one manufacturer may beneﬁt the brands of other manufac-
turers: services and investments by a manufacturer are not speciﬁc to the brand. ED can
eliminate this externality by excluding other brands from the retailer’s set, but manufac-
turers do not always choose ED in equilibrium. ED eliminates the externality and provides
incentives to invest in brand-enhancing. Manufacturers, however, might be better oﬀ with-
out ED, because it eliminates competition in brand-enhancing investments. Besanko and
Perry ﬁnd cases in which NED is the dominant strategy, and cases in which some, but not
all, manufacturers choose ED. Another possible equilibrium is that in which all manufactur-
ers choose ED. When comparing consumer surplus under the three equilibria, Besanko and
Perry ﬁnd that it is highest in the case in which all manufacturers choose ED, next highest
in the mixed case, and lowest in the case in which all manufacturers choose NED. Social
welfare in the case in which all manufacturers adopt ED exceeds social welfare in the mixed
case and in the case in which all manufacturers adopt NED. This implies that a ban on
ED would beneﬁt manufacturers at the expense of consumers, with the increase in industry
proﬁts being less than the loss in consumer surplus.
The papers reviewed so far in this section show that manufacturers have incentives to
adopt ED contracts in order to reduce downstream competition. Rey and Stiglitz (1988,
1995) show that, when manufacturers are imperfectly competing upstream and retailers are
imperfectly competing downstream, ED reduces not only downstream competition (inter-
brand), but also upstream competition (intrabrand). ED reduces competition between man-
ufacturers by making wholesale price cuts less attractive. At the same time, ED essentially
grants monopoly power to the retailer over a fraction of the ﬁnal demand. Therefore, the
retailer charges a higher price than they would in the absence of ED. The resulting wholesale
prices are also higher compared with those in the absence of ED. When they are allowed to,
manufacturers use franchise fees to extract the surplus from their exclusive retailers. Slade
(1998) ﬁnds empirical evidence for the results of Rey and Stiglitz.
Lin (1990) examines the same problem as Rey and Stiglitz (1988). He assumes that two
competing manufacturers can choose to distribute their products through a common retailer
20or use a specialist retailer who agrees to carry the manufacturer’s product exclusively. When
manufacturers distribute their products through a common retailer, competition among man-
ufacturers drives wholesale prices below marginal costs. Manufacturers use franchise fees to
obtain positive proﬁts. They therefore prefer to distribute through an exclusive retailer.
This allows them to price above marginal cost. As a result, consumer prices are higher and
social welfare is lower than when manufacturers sell to a common retailer.
The results in Lin (1990) depend on the ability of manufacturers to exploit a common
retailer. The common retailer in Lin’s model internalizes any pricing externalities between
the two manufacturers and joint proﬁts are maximized. Manufacturers can then employ
franchise fees and extract all the surplus, leaving the retailer with zero proﬁts. O’Brien and
Shaﬀer (1993) argue that the common retailer can credibly threaten to stop carrying any one
product and earn a positive surplus. In this case, both manufacturers prefer to sell through
independent retailers and welfare is higher under ED than when products are sold through
a common retailer.
Raﬀ and Schmitt (2000) analyze the use of vertical restraints in an international trade
context. They build a model with one domestic and one foreign manufacturer, each of whom
market their products through retailers in a given country or region. Raﬀ and Schmitt
investigate the extent to which trade liberalization can lead to increased use of ETs. In their
model, the choice of ETs by the manufacturers is determined endogenously by trading oﬀ
costs and beneﬁts. The beneﬁt of using ETs is that it reduces competition between domestic
and foreign manufacturers. Its cost is that it exposes risk-averse retailers to uncertainties,
such as trade barriers. This type of uncertainty arises in international trade mainly because
policies and regulations are vague and ambiguous. The equilibrium choice of ETs is thus
the optimal trade-oﬀ between reducing price competition and insuring retailers. Raﬀ and
Schmitt show that trade policy has non-trivial eﬀects on the choice of ETs. More speciﬁcally,
they determine conditions under which trade liberalization can lead manufacturers to use
ETs, and conditions under which it induces manufacturers to stop using ETs. In the former
scenario, manufacturers substitute private anti-competitive arrangements for government-
imposed barriers.
214 Retail Market Power
In the previous sections, it has been assumed that the manufacturers have all the bargaining
power and that they use this power to impose vertical restraints on retailers to extract all the
surplus. The literature has focused on vertical restraints imposed by manufacturers because,
until recently, they had more bargaining power than retailers. However, the bargaining power
has shifted at the retail level over the last three decades. Retailers have become bigger due
to economies of scale and scope. This has given rise to chain stores and big-box stores,
which now dominate most areas of retail activity.3 The shift in bargaining power to the
retail level allows retailers to impose vertical restraints on manufacturers. Such restraints,
as seen in practice, usually take the form of “negative” ﬁxed fees: manufacturers basically
provide cheap loans and technology or pay retailers slotting allowances to encourage them
to carry a new product or allocate minimum shelf space to a product.
The literature is mixed with respect to the welfare eﬀects of vertical restraints imposed
by retailers. The earliest work to address this question is by Galbraith (1952). He argues
that bigger retailers are able to exercise countervailing power over manufacturers to lower
wholesale prices and they are willing to pass these savings to consumers. Galbraith thus
claims that countervailing power is socially desirable because it increases the consumer sur-
plus (it reduces consumer prices). Galbraith does not, however, explain why big retailers
would have incentives to pass on the cost-savings to consumers. A number of recent papers
that analyze Galbraith’s claim both theoretically and empirically ﬁnd that countervailing
power does not always lead to lower consumer prices.
Consider a simple environment with one manufacturer and n retailers. As before, pi
w
is the wholesale price that retailer i has to pay the manufacturer and pi is the consumer
price charged by retailer i. In vector notation, pw = (p1
w;::;pn






w) and p¡i = (p1;::;pi¡1;pi+1;::;pn). The sequence of decisions is
as follows:
² Stage 1: Wholesale prices pi
w, i = 1;n, are negotiated between the manufacturer and
each retailer.
3See, for example, Genest-Laplante (2000), OECD (1999), and The Economist (1997, 1998, 1999) for
more on trends in retailing.
22² Stage 2: Retailers compete for consumers.
The most common assumption regarding negotiation at the ﬁrst stage is that of Nash bar-
gaining. Diﬀerent assumptions, however, can be made on the type of competition between
retailers at the second stage. Consider, in turn, three diﬀerent assumptions for the second-
stage competition:
(i) Bertrand competition: retailers choose consumer prices simultaneously and indepen-
dently (Dobson and Waterson, 1997).
(ii) Cournot competition: retailers compete by choosing quantities to sell (von Ungern-
Sternberg, 1996).
(iii) Perfect competition: retailers are price takers on the market for the ﬁnal product (von
Ungern-Sternberg, 1996).
4.1 Bertrand competition
Having agreed on the wholesale price with the manufacturer, each retailer chooses the con-









where qi = Di(p) is the demand function faced by retailer i. Assume a linear (inverse)
demand function of the form
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where ° measures the degree of intrabrand rivalry. A higher ° indicates that retailer services
are closer substitutes.
The ﬁrst-order conditions for the maximization problem (24) determine the Nash equi-
librium consumer prices, pi(pw), which can then be used to determine the proﬁts of the
manufacturer and retailer i as functions of the wholesale price: ΠM(pw) and ΠRi(pw).
Return to the bargaining stage to determine the equilibrium wholesale prices, pi
w
¤. At
stage one, the manufacturer engages in separate bargaining with each retailer over the whole-
sale price, pi
w
¤. The equilibrium wholesale price, pi
w



















w ) is the manufacturer’s threat point (or outside option), which represents
the proﬁt the manufacturer can obtain by dealing only with the other n ¡ 1 retailers, and
® ´ ¯=(1 ¡ ¯) is the retailer’s bargaining power.4 The retailer’s threat point is zero, since
they do not have any other outside option, given that the manufacturer is a monopolist.
Solving the bargaining problem (26) gives the equilibrium wholesale prices pi
w
¤, i = 1;n.




With the equilibrium wholesale price having been determined, the equilibrium consumer
price can be obtained as a function of p¤(°;n), where ° is a measure of how similar the
retailers’ services are perceived to be when they are selling the product. In a simulation
exercise, Dobson and Waterson (1997) show that, when retailer services are regarded as very
close substitutes (° is high), consumer prices fall close to the competitive level and social
welfare increases with the decline in the number of retailers in the market. The reverse is
true when ° is low.
The results imply that, when retailers compete in a Bertrand fashion, it is beneﬁcial to
allow concentration in the retail market only when retailer services are very close substitutes.
If, however, retailer services are weak substitutes, greater concentration leads to higher
consumer prices and lower social welfare.
4.2 Cournot competition








The ﬁrst-order condition determines the equilibrium quantity, q, the same for all retailers
(by symmetry). The consumer price is then p(pw;n), which is increasing in the wholesale
price, pw, and decreasing in the number of retailers, n.
4Dobson and Waterson (1997) take ¯ = 1=2 and examine the eﬀects of retail market concentration on
consumer prices and social welfare. Thus, they do not consider the direct eﬀect of retailer bargaining power
on ﬁnal prices and welfare.
24Anticipating p(pw;n), the manufacturer bargains with each retailer over the wholesale
price. The Nash bargaining problem is similar to (26) and allows one to obtain the equi-
librium wholesale price pw(®;n), which is decreasing in bargaining power ® and increasing
in the number of retailers n. The idea is that, for any bargaining power ®, an increase in
the number of retailers reduces the manufacturer’s dependence on any one of them, and this
leads to a higher wholesale price.
Substituting the wholesale price back into p(pw;n) gives the equilibrium consumer price
p(®;n), decreasing in both ® and n. An increase in the retailers’ bargaining power allows
them to extract lower wholesale prices from the manufacturer and pass them on to the
consumer. However, greater downstream concentration (lower n) leads to higher consumer
prices, which refutes Galbraith’s claim that retailer countervailing power leads to lower ﬁnal
prices. The intuition for this result is as follows. In order for the retailer to extract lower
wholesale prices from the manufacturer, it is necessary that the latter has a lot to lose in
terms of sales if they do not deal with the retailer; that is, the manufacturer has a low threat
point. This also means that the retailer faces a relatively inelastic demand curve, which
leads to high markups.
4.3 Perfect competition
Under perfect competition, retailers are price takers in the downstream market. Assume
that retailer i’s marginal cost is of the form
c(q
i;n) = g + hnq
i; (28)
which reﬂects the fact that the slope of each retailer’s marginal cost depends on the total









where the retailer takes pi as given. The ﬁrst-order condition gives the equilibrium quantity,
q(pw), which is the same for all retailers. The (linear) demand function then determines the
equilibrium consumer price, p(pw), which is increasing in the wholesale price. For a linear
demand function, the consumer price does not depend directly on the number of retailers,
as in the case of Cournot competition.
25Going back to the ﬁrst stage and solving the Nash bargaining problem, the equilibrium
wholesale price, pw(®;n), can be obtained, which is increasing in n. This implies that
greater concentration in the retail market leads to lower consumer prices. Although one
could conclude that this result supports Galbraith’s claim, von Ungern-Sternberg argues
that it is in fact perfect competition at the retail level that leads to lower prices, rather than
retailer countervailing power.
Chen (2001) examines the same question by assuming that the market structure at the
retail level is characterized by a dominant ﬁrm facing a competitive fringe. Within this
setting, Chen shows that countervailing power makes consumers better oﬀ by reducing retail
prices, but that it does not always increase social welfare, because of possible eﬃciency
losses in retailing. The existence of the competitive fringe at the retail level is key for
countervailing power to beneﬁt consumers. The lower retail price is not caused by a dominant
retailer passing on the cost-savings they have obtained from the manufacturer, as Galbraith
predicted; rather, the lower price is the result of a manufacturer trying to oﬀset the reduction
in proﬁts caused by the rise in countervailing power. This works as follows. An increase in
the power of the dominant retailer reduces the manufacturer’s share of joint proﬁts. As a
result, the manufacturer charges retailers a lower wholesale price, thus boosting their sales.
The fall in the wholesale price paid by the fringe retailers shifts their supply curve to the
right, which results in a lower retail price.
Ellison and Snyder (2001) test Galbraith’s claim empirically using data on wholesale
prices for antibiotics sold through various distribution channels in the United States for the
period 1990–96. The empirical analysis provides evidence that substitution opportunities
among diﬀerent suppliers are a more important source of countervailing power than buyer
size. Ellison and Snyder ﬁnd that hospitals and health maintenance organizations (HMOs),
which can use restrictive formularies to increase their substitution opportunities, obtain
lower prices than drugstores. Hospitals and HMOs essentially control which drugs their
aﬃliated doctors prescribe by allowing their managers to substitute branded drugs for drugs
on patent, and to substitute branded for generic manufacturers in the case of oﬀ-patent
drugs. Drugstore substitution opportunities are, however, more limited, because drugstores
need to ﬁll the prescriptions their customers bring in as written.
Only Snyder (1996) examines countervailing power in a dynamic framework. In his paper,
the retailer is able to alter their intertemporal consumption pattern. The retailer receives a
26steady stream of orders from manufacturers, but may wait and satisfy those orders at the
same time. By accumulating a backlog of orders and purchasing all of them at once, the
retailer may obtain a strategic advantage over the manufacturers. Snyder argues that this
oﬀ-equilibrium-path threat is enough to constrain the price the manufacturer charges the
retailer, even if the retailer purchases every period.
Another stream of literature examines the eﬀects of slotting allowances on consumer
prices and welfare. A slotting allowance is a fee that manufacturers pay retailers for carrying
new products or allocating shelf space to their products. Shaﬀer (1991) develops a three-
stage model where manufacturers compete for retailers. At the ﬁrst stage, manufacturers
simultaneously choose a two-part tariﬀ that speciﬁes the wholesale price and a ﬁxed fee.
The ﬁxed fee can be negative, in which case it corresponds to a slotting allowance. The
manufacturer can also specify an RPM requirement. At the second stage, retailers choose
which manufacturer to buy from and, at the third stage, they simultaneously choose their
resale prices. Shaﬀer shows that, in equilibrium, manufacturers can oﬀer retailers both RPM
and slotting allowances, and that the result is a lower total surplus compared with the case
of no RPM, no slotting allowances. RPM and slotting allowances are used strategically to
reduce competition at the retail level. The idea is simple. Slotting allowances represent
ﬁxed costs that force manufacturers to increase the wholesale price above marginal cost. It
follows that retailers, in turn, set resale prices above marginal cost (i.e., the wholesale price).
Retailers therefore have incentives to commit to positive slotting allowances, because they
eﬀectively reduce downstream competition and increase proﬁts.
Chu (1992) turns Shaﬀer’s results on their head by showing that, unless advance adver-
tising is suﬃciently eﬀective, slotting allowances yield higher total proﬁts and higher social
welfare. In Chu’s framework, manufacturers can signal their quality through advertising and
retailers screen the manufacturers’ quality by requiring slotting allowances. In equilibrium,
only high-quality manufacturers oﬀer slotting allowances and low-quality manufacturers are
screened out of the market, which results in higher social welfare. What distinguishes Chu
(1992) from Shaﬀer (1991) is the fact that the former assumes that retailers require slot-
ting allowances, whereas the latter takes manufacturers to oﬀer slotting allowance willingly.
Lariviere and Padmanabhan (1997) assume, like Shaﬀer (1991), that the manufacturer can
willingly choose to oﬀer a slotting allowance. Oﬀering slotting allowances serves two pur-
poses: it signals product quality and it enables a share in the retailer’s cost associated with
27stocking the product. The main result of the paper is that, in equilibrium, the high-demand
manufacturer oﬀers a positive slotting allowance and a lower wholesale price.
Sullivan (1997) argues that slotting allowances are consistent with competitive behaviour
and might have been a result of an increase in the supply of products. She develops a
consumer search cost model to show that, when an increase in the supply of products is
not accompanied by an increase in sales per store, the equilibrium slotting allowance will
increase.
Rennhoﬀ (2002) allows for diﬀerent manufacturer brands (or quality) in the slotting
allowance game. His sequence of decisions diﬀers from that in Shaﬀer (1991). At stage one,
manufacturers oﬀer slotting allowances to the retailers. At the second stage, upon observing
these oﬀers, retailers choose which brand to carry. At the third stage, manufacturers observe
the retailer’s choice of brand and choose wholesale prices. At the last stage, the retailer sets
resale prices for the brands they choose to carry. Rennhoﬀ’s analysis shows that an increase
in the brand quality increases retailer markups, but has an ambiguous eﬀect on optimal
slotting allowances. The intuition for the ambiguous result is as follows. On the one hand,
an increase in the brand quality increases the manufacturer’s expected proﬁts. This, in turn,
increases the slotting allowance the manufacturer would be willing to oﬀer to increase the
probability of receiving the premium shelf space. On the other hand, an increase in the
brand quality also increases the retailer’s expected payoﬀ from oﬀering the manufacturer the
premium shelf space. This would push the optimal slotting allowance down. The overall
eﬀect is ambiguous due to the two eﬀects working in opposite directions. Rennhoﬀ further
estimates the model using quarterly data from the ketchup industry in 40 metropolitan areas
of the United States for the period 1988–92. The preliminary results support the predictions
of the theoretical model. Rennhoﬀ’s study is interesting in that not all manufacturers oﬀer
slotting allowances in equilibrium. The empirical results show that, depending on their brand
quality, some manufacturers have more incentive than others to oﬀer slotting allowances.
5 Conclusions
This survey has shown that, in equilibrium, both the upstream and downstream ﬁrms can
use vertical restraints as a means of capturing the surplus of the vertical structure. The
choice of one vertical restraint over others depends critically on the speciﬁc market structure
28assumptions and the division of bargaining power. It has been shown that vertical restraints
have important eﬀects on consumer and producer prices, market structure, eﬃciency, and
welfare; the initial market structure downstream and upstream provides incentives for re-
tailers and manufacturers to use vertical restraints. The use of these restraints determines,
in turn, the ﬁnal market structure. To see this, recall the case where the upstream market is
monopolistic and the downstream market is competitive. In this framework, the manufac-
turer has incentives to impose vertical restraints, such as exclusive territories, to eliminate
the horizontal externality. Competition among retailers gives rise to horizontal externali-
ties. The manufacturer can eliminate the externality by reducing downstream competition.
Exclusive territories serve this purpose by granting each retailer a monopoly position over a
geographical area or a class of consumers. Thus, exclusive territories have anti-competitive
eﬀects and reduce welfare.
Although the industrial organization literature on retail pricing is extensive, it is almost
entirely static. More research is required on price-setting behaviour in a dynamic framework
to allow a better understanding of the role of non-linear pricing and non-price instruments in
the frequency of price changes at the manufacturing and retail level. At the same time, more
empirical research is needed to quantify the importance of vertical restraints for price-setting
at the industry level. Another area of interest is that of electronic markets. The introduction
of electronic markets into the standard models of vertical restraints might change dramati-
cally some of the predictions of those models. For example, retailers might get around ETs
arrangements by reverting to electronic markets. Electronic markets can also provide man-
ufacturers with a way of reaching consumers without an intermediary. More analysis needs
to be done along these lines both at the micro- and macroeconomic levels.
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